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NOTES
TAX TREATMENT OF PREVIOUSLY EXPENSED ASSETS IN CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
Internal Revenue Code section 336 1 requires nonrecognition of
any gain on property distributed in liquidation. But where a liquidating corporation distributes in kind to its shareholders assets for
which it took a business expense deduction2 from a prior year's taxable income,3 allowing the corporation to retain the benefit of the preI. I.R.C. § 336 provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section
453B (relating to disposition of installment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation.
(b) LIFO Inventory.(1) IN GENERAL.-If a corporation inventorying goods under the LIFO method distributes inventory assets in partial or complete liquidation, then the LIFO reca~ture amount
with respect to such assets shall be treated as gain to the corporation recogmzed from the
sale of such inventory assets.
(2) EXCEPTION WHERE BASIS DETERMINED UNDER SECTION 334(b)(l).-Paragraph (I)
shall not apply to any liquidation under section 332 for which the basis of property received is determined under section 334(b)(1 ).
(3) LIFO RECAPTURE AM0UNT.-For purposes of this subsection, the term "LIFO recapture amount" means the amount (if any) by which(A) the inventory amount of the inventory assets under the first-in, first-out method
authorized by section 471, exceeds
{B) the inventory amount of such assets under the LIFO method.
(4) DEFINITI0Ns.-For purposes of this subsection (A) LIFO METH0D.-The term "LIFO method" means the method authorized by section 472 (relating to last-in, first-out inventories).
(B) OTHER DEFINITIONS.-The term "inventory assets" has the meaning given to such
term by subparagraph (A) of section 3ll(b)(2), and the term "inventory amount" has the
meaning given to such term by subparagraph (B) of section 3ll(b)(2) (as modified by
paragraph (3) of section 3ll(b)).
2. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162 (trade or business expenses) and 212 (expenses for production of
income). These provisions ensure that tax is levied on net income.
3. Liquidating distributions of previously expensed assets in kind may seem to be rare, but
the problem is not without practical importance. The Internal Revenue Service reports 15
current cases pending involving potential tax liability of $ l. 7 million. Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 4, United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc., No. 81-930 (U.S. 1981 Term). Further, the
resolution of cases involving distributions in kind may carry over to the presumably more
co=on situation involving distribution of the proceeds of sale of such property. See note 14
infra.
There are several situations in which assets existing at the time of liquidation may have
been properly expensed in a previous tax year. I.R.C. § 162 allows the deduction of "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business." Although "[t]he expense deduction as permitted by regulation is intended
to reflect the cost of [items] actually consumed during the taxable year," Spitalny v. United
States, 430 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original), the Service allows, under some
circumstances, the full cost of assets not completely consumed in the taxable year to be deducted. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 59-249, 1959-2 C.B. 55 (allowing "expensing" of business property
with an average useful life ofless than one year); Treas. Reg. § l.162-3 (1958) (allowing deduction of the total cost of supplies and materials for which no records of c'Qnsumption or
inventories are kept, so long as "taxable income is clearly reflected by this method."); Treas.
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vious deduction without recognizing a gain on the unconsumed
expensed assets appears to constitute a windfall. 4 Although the deductions represented actual cost at the time, and the corporation retains only valueless retired stock after the distribution, the mere
survival of expensed assets at liquidation arguably constitutes current gain that should be subject to taxation at the corporate rate.
The courts5 and commentators6 have disagreed about the appropriate corporate tax in this situation, and the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Bliss .Dairy, Inc. v. United States7 to settle the
dispute.
Reg.§ l.446-l(a)(4)(ii), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 218 (requiring capitalization only of assets with
a life extending substantially beyond the tax year).
In addition, I.R.C. § 179 allows expense treatment ofup to $5000 (increasing to $7,500 for
taxable years beginning in 1984 or 1985, and to $10,000 thereafter) in aggregate value of depreciable business assets placed in service in the year of the deduction. This amount is explicitly
recaptured upon disposition of the assets under I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2). See note 126 infra.
4. The apparent windfall results from the taxpayer's receipt of two benefits from the
purchase price of the assets: (a) the tax deduction and (b) the assets themselves. The Code, by
allowing deductions for expenses but not for capital investment, is intended to make these two
benefits mutually exclusive. That is, if the assets are consumed during the tax year, expense
treatment is permitted. I.R.C. § 162. But if the assets have a useful life extending beyond the
tax year, their cost would ordinarily be a nondeductible capital investment. I.R.C. § 263. The
expense treatment allowed under Rev. Rul. 59-249 and Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3, supra note 3,
allows the possibility of the double benefit, producing a windfall to the corporation equal to
the value of the assets.
5. Compare Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), qffd,
582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (holding that the value of previously expensed assets held at the time of distribution is includable in ordinary income of the
corporation) with Commisioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 1963)
(holding that I.R.C. § 336 extends nonrecognition to distributions in kind of previously expensed property). The Seventh Circuit has accepted the reasoning in Tennessee-Carolina in
Hillsboro Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981) and First Trust and Sav.
Bank v. United States, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its
ruling in South Lake Farms in Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 1250 (1982).
6. See, e.g., Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1978); Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment Under Sections 337 and 334(b)(2), 34
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 57, 71 (1976); Broenen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Sections 332,
334(b)(2) and 336, 53 TAXES 231 (1975); Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to Corporate
Liquidations and Contributions to Capital· Recent .Developments, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215
(1980); Epstein, The Tax Benefit Rule in Corporate Liquidations, 6 TAX ADVISER 454 (1975);
Forte, Corporate Liquidations - Sections 336 and 337 of the Internal Revenue Code - Parity
Between a .Direct Sale ofAssets and a Stock Purchase -Another Laok at Tennessee-Carolina
and R. M. Smith, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 199 (1980); Gutkin & Beck, Section 337: IRS wrong
in taxing, at time of liquidation, items previously deducted, 17 J. TAX. 146 (1962); Morrison,
Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54 TAXES 902
(1976); O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax
Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV. 215 (1972);
Reveley & Pratt, Tax Benefit Rule: What Constitutes a Recovery? Sixth and Ninth Circuits
.Disagree, 57 TAXES 416 (1979); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and Corporate Liquidations: Baiting the "Trap for the Unwary", 4 J. CoRP. L. 681 (1979); Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of
Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure far the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV.
995 (1968); Note, The Tax Benefit, Recoveries, and Sales ofProperty Under Section 337, 9 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 476 (1967).
7. 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982).
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The leading case in this area is Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Commissioner. 8 The majority of the Sixth Circuit panel
hearing the case affirmed the holding of a closely divided Tax Court
that a subsidiary corporation which distributed previously expensed
truck tires and tubes to its parent corporation upon liquidation was
liable for tax on their fair market value. The holding was based on
the tax benefit rule, a judicially created doctrine now codified in section 111 which allows taxation of "recoveries" of amounts previously
deducted to the extent that the deductions resulted in a tax benefit. 9
The court avoided the threshold question of whether there was a "recovery" by relying on a dictum in Estate of Block10 stating that
"[w]hen recovery or some other event which is inconsistent with what
has been done in the past occurs, adjustments must be made in reporting income for the year in which the change occurs." 11 The
court found two facts inconsistent with the prior expense treatment
of the tires and tubes: (a) the survival of the assets upon liquidation
despite their treatment as an expense, and (b) the step-up, or increase, in their basis value in the hands of the transferee, to fair market value. 12
The court also compared the case to those arising under Code
section 337, 13 which was designed to remove arbitrary distinctions
'between distributions of assets in liquidation and the sale of the assets and distribution of the proceeds. 14 To preserve consistency with
8. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), qffd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
9. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 111; Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); I J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.34 (Supp. 1981). Note that the Treasury broadens
the scope of section 111 well beyond the limited number of cases enumerated in the statute.
Treas. Reg. §1.111-l(a)(l) (1956).
10. 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), qffd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60
(7th Cir. 1940).
II. 39 B.T.A. at 341 (emphasis added).
12. 582 F.2d at 382. A step-up in basis to fair market value is equivalent to the treatment
that the Code would apply in the event of a purchase at that price. See I.R.C. § 1012. Thus
the transaction is treated like a sale. In fact, the step-up is not necessarily to fair market value.
See note 61 i'!fra.
13. 582 F.2d at 383. I.R.C. § 337(a) provides:
GENERAL RuLE.-If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are
distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or
loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property
within such 12 month period.
14. I.R.C § 337 provides that, with certain exceptions, the corporation will not recognize
gain on property sold within one year of a liquidating distribution of the proceeds of the sales
to the shareholders. This section was intended to eliminate the trap for the unwary created by
the decisions in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) and United States v.
Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83 Cong., 2d
Sess. 259 (1954). In Court Holding, the Court held that the proceeds of a sale by the shareholder of assets received in liquidation were not eligible for § 336 nonrecognition because the
sale, having been initiated by the shareholder in his capacity as a corporate officer was, in
effect, a pre-liquidation sale by the corporation. In Cumberland Public Service, the Court held
that a sale arranged prior to liquidation by an officer/shareholder to take place after liquida-
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established precedent applying the tax benefit rule in section 337
cases, 15 the court ruled that the Tennessee-Carolina result should be
sustained. 16
The dissenters in Tennessee-Carolina argued that the majority
had misapplied the tax benefit rule. Judge Tannenwald of the Tax
Court argued that before the tax benefit rule applies, there must be
an actual recovery that would be treated as income in the absence of
the limitation allowed by the rule.17 According to the Tax Court
dissenters, the corporation recovered nothing; only the shareholders
gained anything by the liquidating distribution of previously expensed assets. The dissenters did not find that the corporation had
benefited from any taxable "recovery" as a result of the continued
existence of the tubes and tires or the end of the need to consume
them. 18 The dissenters saw no reason to override the nonrecognition
provided by section 336, and distinguished the section 337 cases by
noting that there clearly is a recovery in that context, 19 and that even
on the face of the statute, sections 336 and 337 were not designed to
remove all differences in tax consequences between distributions in
kind and of proceeds.20
tion was within § 336 if the officer acted in his personal, rather than corporate capacity. Section 337 eliminates the need to draw this fine distinction.
15. See, e.g., Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); Commissioner v.
Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); Anders v. United States,
462 F.2d 1147 (Cl Cl. 1972); Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
16. See 582 F.2d at 383.
17. See 65 T.C. at 450 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that I.R.C.
§ 111 requires "receipt of amounts in respect of the previously deducted or credited section 111
items." Treas. Reg. § 1.lll-l(a)(2) (1956). But note that Treas. Reg.§ 1.lll-l(a)(2) does not
require a "receipt" of an amount in all cases, since cancellation of taxes is specifically enumerated as a form of "recovery." In Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 679 (1975)
Tannenwald, J., concurring, defined the prerequisites for invoking the tax benefit rule as "(1)
[a]n amount previously deducted, (2) which resulted in a tax benefit, and (3) was recovered
during the taxable year in issue." The dissent refused to view the continued existence of assets
that were presumed to be consumed as a recovery of those assets or the "receipt" of any
amount.
18. 582 F.2d at 384. For a discussion of the "end of need" argument, see notes 115-18
infra, and accompanying text.
19. Section 337 addresses the sale of corporate assets in liquidation rather than the distribution of assets in kind. The corporation clearly recovers, since it receives cash for the assets.
65 T.C. at 452 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); 582 F.2d 387 (Weick, J., concurring and dissenting). Note, however that the majority both in the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals would
have found this fact irrelevant, since it found a constructive "recovery" merely by the continued existence of expensed assets at the time of liquidation. 65 T.C. at 448; 582 F.2d at 382.
20. 65 T.C. at 453 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting); 582 F.2d at 387 (Weick, J., concurring and
dissenting). The Tax Court dissent specifically notes the inconsistencies in the tax treatment
enumerated in B. Bl'ITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS (4th ed. 1979). These include: (a) sale of inventory or stock in trade; (b)
transactions not treated as sales or exchanges; (c) assignment of income, see Commissioner v.
Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); (d) transactions subject to recapture under§§ 1245
and 1250; and (e) costs of sale. Exceptions (c) and (d) also apply to § 336; (b) is not an issue
for distributions. The exceptions for stock in trade and cost of arranging for disposition do
represent inconsistencies between the treatment of dispositions and sale. Bittker and Eustice
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This Note argues that although the Tennessee-Carolina majority
adopts overbroad language and ignores established tax principles, 21
a more careful refinement of its theory will yield the same proper
result, without, in most situations, departing from accepted principles. The proper inquiry must focus first on whether the corporation
has received any benefit, and then on whether that gain should be
exempted by the nonrecognition provisions of section 336, or on any
other basis. Part I of this Note examines these questions from a theoretical perspective, and concludes that expensed assets remaining at
the time of liquidation give rise to corporate income, and that
neither their distribution nor the liquidation of the corporation serve
point out that the exception is necessary w;ider § 337 to distinguish between sale in the ordinary course of business and winding up activities. There is no reason to doubt that the distribution of assets is a winding up activity, at least of the corporation, if not of the enterprise in a
more general sense.
21. In particular, the inconsistent event test seems to imply no stopping point short of a
complete rejection of the annual accounting principle, which provides that income taxes are to
be assessed on the basis of receipts and costs during the tax year. See, e.g., Burnet v. Sanford
& Brooks, 282 U.S. 359, 354 (1931):
The excess of gross income over deductions did not any the less constitute net income for
the taxable period because respondent, in an earlier period, suffered net losses in the conduct of its business which were in some measure attributable to expenditures made to
produce the net income of the latter period.
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), did not overrule Saeford & Brooks, and did
not endorse the transactional (rather than annual) method of computing rejected in that case.
Instead, .Dobson held only that events in prior years could be examined to determine whether
present receipts constitute gain or merely recovery of capital. 320 U.S. at 506-07. The Code
mitigates the effect of the annual accounting principle through the use of several provisions,
including I.R.C. § 172 (allowing net operating loss carryovers),§ 111 (the statutory tax benefit
rule), and§ 1341 (allowing transactional approach where the taxpayer restores an amount held
under a ctaim•of right). The tax benefit rule is not simply a matter of correcting earlier mistakes. For example, it does not eliminate the statute of limitations. I.R.C. § 6501. In recognizing the tax benefit rule, the .Dobson Court clearly did not intend to override the statute of
limitations (as that case would have required):
The Tax Court has not attempted to revise liability for earlier years closed by the statute
of limitations, nor used any expense, liability, or deficit of a prior year to reduce the
income of a subsequent year. It went to prior years only to determine the nature of the
recovery, whether return of capital or income.
320 U.S. at 493.
Further evidence that the intent is not to reopen previous returns is provided by the fact
that rather than adding the recovery to the taxable income for the year of the deduction (where
the statute of limitations has not run) and computing the additional tax liability at the prior
marginal tax rate, the recovery is added to current income and taxed accordingly. The former
approach was taken in Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958), but later abandoned by the Court of Claims in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399
(Ct. Cl. 1967). No other court has adopted this approach.
I.R.C. § 111 operates in essentially the same manner as the judicial rule in .Dobson. Given
the "recovery" of an amount, the effect of§ 111 is to treat the recovery as either repayment of
an earlier cost (not taxable) or taxable gain depending on whether earlier income has already
been treated (with a corresponding tax benefit) as repayment of the cost in question. Beyond
this limited circumstance, the annual accounting principle is left intact.
The inconsistent event test, on the other hand, takes a transactional view of tax liability.
The transactional view, although appealing to some commentators, see, e.g., Note, 21 VAND.
L. REv. 995, supra note 6, raises practical problems that annual accounting avoids. See, e.g.,
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 6 (inconsistent event test may be too "imperial" but is in the
right direction).
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to dissipate the gain before it is realized. Nonrecognition treatment
should not, as a matter of either rational tax policy or congressional
intent, be extended to previously expensed assets.
Part II focuses on the language of the Code, and offers a construction of section 336 which limits its scope to gains or losses
caused by changes in the value of the assets; under this interpretation, the tax benefit conferred by the original deduction of the assets'
cost would be recognized as income, realized but not engendered by
the liquidation. The available evidence of congressional intent fully
supports this interpretation, and may independently justify the result
defended by this Note. Finally, even if section 336 unequivocally
bars recognition of the gain resulting from distribution of previously
expensed assets, its application to previously expensed assets implicates the policies of section 111, the statutory tax benefit rule. The
conflict between these sections should be resolved in favor of section
111, because denying nonrecognition to previously expensed assets
does not contravene the policy purposes of section 336. Given that
reasonable interpretations of the Code are consistent with the principles of rational tax policy articulated in Part I, the Note concludes
that the courts should apply the tax benefit rule to previously expensed assets distributed in liquidation.

I.

THEORETICAL GROUNDS FOR RECOGNITION OF GAIN

The theoretical argument favoring recognition of gain on the distribution of previously expensed assets relies on three subsidiary
claims: (a) the corporation is theoretically enriched by the survival
of previously expensed assets given that it premised an-expense deduction on their consumption; (b) the necessity of distributing the
assets to the shareholders in return for stock that will be valueless
because of liquidation does not dissipate the gain to the corporation;
and (c) the congressional policies reflected in nonrecognition provisions in general, and section 336 in particular, reveal no intention to
exclude the type of gain that results from the survival of previously
expensed assets.
A.

Corporate Gain

A frequently cited22 general definition of income is the HaigSimons definition: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of (I) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question."23 While this rule is
22. See, e.g., w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 212 (2d ed. 1979).
23. ff. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
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too broad to serve as a practical basis for income taxation, 24 the concept is useful in that when a taxpayer has received income under the
Haig-Simons definition, a decision not to tax should be justified by
practical or tax preference concerns rather than theoretical
grounds. 25 Although deducting the cost of assets that are not consumed increases the "store of property rights," the tax system ignores
this increase, largely for reasons of administrative convenience. 26
This view of corporate enrichment resembles that advanced by Justice Holmes in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 27 to reach income
arising out of a discharge of indebtedness. In that case, the taxpayer
received the proceeds of a loan and incurred a corresponding debt
in one year, for which no tax liability arose because the two were
offsetting. In a later year, when the debt was discharged, the gain
represented by the receipt of the loan proceeds became taxable. 28 In
the case of previously expensed assets, the taxpayer has paid for the
assets and treated the payment as a reduction in wealth (f.e., as a
deduction from income). Since the tax system permits the deduction
for the purpose of limiting taxation to net income, this accession to
wealth is not recognized, because an offsetting "liability" arises from
24. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Summary and Explanation of.Discussion .Draft ofPro•
posed Regulations on Fringe Benefits (September 5, 1975), (1975] P-H FED. TAXES~ 65,667,
quoted in W. ANDREWS, supra note 22, at 35; Coven, The .Decline and Fall of Taxable Income,
79 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1526 (1981).
25. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, supra note 24, ~ 65,667 (''theoretical definitions of income have
not been used for the practical purpose of assessing taxes, except as a frame of reference
against which to judge the existing system.").
26. To illustrate that the "store of property rights" has been increased, consider two taxpayers identical in every respect except that one purchases $1000 worth of supplies subject to
expense treatment and the other buys $2000 worth. If both consume $1000 worth of the supplies during the year, the first taxpayer will retain an additional $1000 in earnings, on which he
will pay tax of about $500, whereas the second taxpayer retains $1000 worth of supplies on
which he pays no tax.
If assets were expensed only when actually consumed, there would be no accumulation of
previously expensed assets. The rules that permit expensing of certain items before they are
actually consumed, see note 3 supra, are motivated by administrative convenience. See Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d at 197 (The "regulation is intended . . . to accomplish over a
period of years roughly the same result as would have been had through use of the inventory
method, but by a simpler form of accounting.").
Other examples of income under the Haig-Simons definition that are not taxed for reasons
of administrative convenience include most forms of imputed income, see, e.g., W. ANDREWS,
supra note 22, at 58-61, increases or decreases in the value of holdings of property that are
neither bought nor sold during the tax year, and certain types of fringe benefits that are given
in kind. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 119.
27. 284 U.S. I, 3 (1931) ("As a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets
previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct.").
28. The time of discharge of the debt is the appropriate time of realization. See notes 3031 i'!fra and accompanying text. Deferral is provided for the recipient of this "paper" gain
who-may not have the cash to pay the tax by allowing him to offset the tax liability against
favorable tax attributes such as basis of depreciable property. See notes 69-70 i'!fra. Note that
the key to this argument is the untaxed benefit at the time of the loan. Thus there is no gain
upon the discharge of interest, rather than principal. See Hartland Associates v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1580, 1586 (1970).
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the need to consume the assets for business purposes. But when the
taxpayer later fails to use the assets for business purposes, the accession to wealth reflected by the assets, which went untaxed because of
the ded~ction, should be taxed. 29
Although the Haig-Simons definition recognizes increases in the
total value of an individual's stock of goods as income, the tax system generally recognizes changes in wealth only when the gain is
"realized" by the taxpayer through a transfer, sale, or exchange.30
The purpose of the doctrine of realization is to delay the imposition
of tax until a convenient and equitable time, and not to permanently
bar taxation. 31 The doctrine avoids the administrative burdens and
valuation problems inherent in attempting to measure yearly
changes in the worth of each taxpayer's holdings32 as well as the
harshness that might result if cash-poor taxpayers were forced to liquidate appreciated assets merely to pay the tax on the appreciation.33
Neither rationale for the doctrine would deny that liquidation is an
appropriate time to realize previously unrealized gains.34
B. Amount Realized

Given that accumulated expensed assets of the corporation reflect
unrealized gain, it is important to ascertain whether the gain is dissipated before the event of realization (ie., liquidation). At least two
29. The accession to wealth is the amount of the deduction not- offset by actual business
consumption of the expensed assets. Thus, the surviving assets measure the amount of the
deduction that is income. See note 81 il!fra.
30. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001; Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)
(defining income as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized and over which taxpayers have complete dominion" (emphasis added)); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (the classic formulation of the doctrine of realization).
3 I. See w. ANDREWS, Sllpra note 22, at 205 n.6; M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXTION ~ 5.01, at 71 (3d ed. 1982). Note that deferral may tum into exemption if appreciated
property is held until death or transferred to a charitable organization or low bracket taxpayer.
W. ANDREWS, Sllpra note 22, at 205 n.6.
32. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, Sllpra note 31, ~ 5.01, at 71.
33. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 213.
34. The requirement that a gain be "realized" before it is taxable grows out of two concerns, neither of which is ordinarily compelling once the corporation liquidates. The first concern is administrative: It is inconvenient, particularly in view of valuation difficulties, to
measure and tax all of the "paper'' gains and losses of the taxpayer when transactions are
incomplete in the sense that the same gains and losses may have to be reevaluated in succeeding years. See note 32 Sllpra and accompanying text. Since liquidation is a one-time
event, administrative convenience is no longer served by delaying valuation, except in the
situation where the investment in the assets is viewed as continuing investment by a single
taxpayer, with liquidation resulting in a change in form only. These circumstances are examined in the text accompanying notes 56-65 infra, in the discussion of nonrecognition.
The second reason for delaying realization is solicitude for the taxpayer who might be
forced to dispose of appreciated assets to raise cash to pay the tax on the appreciation. See
note 33 Sllpra and accompanying text. Where the asset is being disposed of in any event, as in
the liquidation setting, this concern is eliminated, except, again, in those situations in which
the liquidation affects only the form of a continuing investment.
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theories might be advanced to support such a conclusion. First, if
the distribution of the assets was business consumption,35 the initial
premise of the deduction would be fulfilled. 36 Dividends, however,
are nondeductible,37 and the consumption of the assets by distribution to shareholders is, similarly, for non-business purposes.
A second argument that the gain is dissipated before realization
maintains that since upon liquidation the corporation must surrender all of its assets in exchange for worthless (upon redemption)
stock, the assets have no value. Judge Weick relies on this argument
in his Court of Appeals dissent in Tennessee-Caro/ina. 38 According
to this view, the corporation receives the stock for which the in-kind
distribution is exchanged, not the assets; hence the assets' continued
existence does not benefit the corporation. 39
35. Compare I.R.C. § 162(a) with I.R.C. § 262 (business, but not personal, expenses deductible in computing net income).
36. In other words, there would then have been no accumulation of expensed, but unconsumed, assets.
37. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, ~ 5.01, at 73. Even if the shareholder will ultimately
consume the asset in pursuit of trade or business, the argument is unpersuasive, because in
most cases the shareholder will take a stepped-up basis which would allow further deductions,
See I.R.C. § 334; notes 61 & 63 infra. But see I.R.C § 334(b)(I) (providing for carryover basis
for certain liquidations of subsidiaries). There should not be two business expense deductions
by two different taxpayers where only one cost has been incurred.
38. 582 F.2d at 385.
39. Although the fair market value of the stock redeemed would be the amount realized
under I.R.C. § 1001, that value is presumably the amount for which the recipient could sell the
property. This amount is zero where the recipient is a liquidating corporation and the prop•
erty is its own stock. Thus the majority's argument in Tennessee-Carolina that the receipt of
stock was a "recovery," see note 109 infra and accompanying text, has rightly drawn criticism.
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 6, at 231; Reveley & Pratt, supra note 6, at 418-20. The majority
ignores the liquidation, which is an essential part of the "exchange," since without liquidation
there would have been no transfer of the assets.
The fact that there is no gain in the sense of I.R.C. § 1001 does not mean that the element
of unrealized gain inherent in the previously expensed assets has disappeared; it has in fact
been passed on to the shareholders. Gains earned while doing business in the corporate form
cannot be shifted to the shareholders as dividends (that is, dividends are not deductible). Similarly, the gain inherent in previously expensed assets was earned (though not realized) while in
the corporate form, and should not be allowed to be shifted to the shareholders. See, e.g.,
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930):
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide
that the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements . • . • That seems to us
the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction can be taken according
to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew.
For a discussion of income attribution between corporations and shareholders, see Molloy,
Some Tax Aspects of Corporate .Distribution in Kind, 6 TAX. L. REV. 57, 61-65 (1950).
The exception in I.R.C. § 336(a) for installment obligations clearly reflects a policy against
this type of income shifting, since installment obligations represent income rather than property. See Helvering v. Horst, 3 I I U.S. 112 (1940). But the general rule in § 336 indicates that
at least some types of gains accrued while in the corporate form may be shifted to the shareholders. The question of which type is addressed in notes 86-96 infra and accompanying text.
Where the shareholder is a corporation, there is no problem of shifting income out of the
corporate system, although there may be other problems depending on which basis rules apply. See note 61 infra.
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But this argument focuses on the wrong event to determine gain.
The gain on the expensed assets is realized upon the liquidation,
since that event forecloses further consumption by the corporation in
the trade or business. But the actual gain took place much earlier,
when the corporation took a tax deduction without ultimately bearing any expense related to the generation of net income.40 The disposition of the assets is therefore irrelevant to the question of the
amount realized. 41 Whether a corporation either sells its assets and
distributes the cash to its shareholders or uses the assets in satisfaction of debts, it realizes a gain on the disposition.42 Allowing- the
corporation to escape tax liability merely by distributing assets in
kind fails to address the actual event of realization and might encourage inefficient allocation of resources.43 Finally, the distribution
itself represents a form of corporate "personal" consumption which
benefits the corporation. To hold that a corporation has not benefitted from the distribution would contradict the Code's treatment of
dividends as essentially "personal" consumption, nondeductible in
computing corporate net income.44 On this basis, the corporation
40. Although the corporation paid for the assets, it premised a tax deduction on the consumption of the assets in the course of the corporation's business. If the assets had been
consumed, the tax paid would have reflected net income. The permanent retention of the
assets realizes an untaxed accession to wealth.
41. Judge Tannenwald's dissent in Tennessee-Carolina, 65 T.C. at 450 & n.l, fails to recognize this crucial point. If the corporation's net worth is unaffected by the disposition of the
assets it is only because net worth was already enhanced at the time of the original expense
deduction. Strict adherence to the annual acounting principle, supra note 21, is not appropriate to foreclose realization of this gain, because the doctrine of realization has long been applied to tax gains in years other than those in which they accrued "on paper." See notes 30-34
supra and accompanying text. Because at the time of the deduction there is every reason to
believe that the assets will be covered, deferral of tax is an appropriate use of the doctrine of
realization. See note 32supra. As of the moment ofliquidation, deferral is no longer possible.
The choices are realization or total exclusion; the latter is not a normally accepted consequence
of the doctrine of realization.
42. The amount realized would be the sale price or the amount of debt discharged. See
I.R.C. § l00I(b); Treas. Reg.§ l.1001~2(a) (1980). This is not to say that 1.R.C. § 337 will not
provide for nonrecognition; that is a separate question. In this regard, it should be noted that
the gain accrues to the corporation at the time it took the deduction, although that gain is not
realized until business consumption of the assets as contemplated by the deduction is no longer
possible.
43. For example, assume that a liquidating corporation has $1000 in cash, $1000 in previously expensed assets and debts totalling $1000. The creditor may be indifferent to receiving
the assets, whereas the shareholders might strongly prefer the cash. However, if the distribution of cash is taxed and the distribution of assets is not, the assets may be diverted to those
who value them less to get the advantage of the tax break. The problem is avoided as long as
both distributions receive the same treatment, whether taxed or not. This same argument favors consistent application of nonrecognition under I.R.C. §§ 336 and 337.
44. See note 37 supra. To illustrate this point, consider a simple case in which a corporation earns no net income in one year and pays a $1000 dividend out of accumulated earnings.
Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, the corporation would have a net loss of $1000
(from the decrease in savings) unless the $1000 dividend is treated as ''the market value of
rights exercised in consumption." The Code requirement that net income be reported as zero
(since dividends are not deductible) is consistent with a policy recognizing dividends as being
just like any oiher form of non-business expenditure and, as such, a form of consumption that
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should be charged with a gain equal to the value of the assets in the
hands of the shareholders.45
C. Recognition of Gain
Given that the corporation realizes a gain on the distribution of
previously expensed assets, the question qf whether the gain should
be recognized requires examination of the policies underlying the
various nonrecognition provisions in the Code.
1.

Section 336

The fundamental premise underlying section 336 is that when a
corporation distributes appreciated assets, it realizes no gain as a result of the appreciation. 46 A corporation could not assign its income
to shareholders and thus avoid the double taxation of dividends, 47
so the assumption that appreciation is not realized does not undermine the conclusion that previously unrealized ordinary income is
realized upon distribution. 48 Appreciation of capital assets of the
corporation may reasonably be viewed as appreciation of the equity
shareholders' interests, with the transfer to the shareholders merely
is presumably of value to the consumer. Treatment of dividends as a form of consumption is
analogous to Professor Simons' argument that gifts should be treated as a form of consumption
by the donor. See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 57 (1938). (Professor Simons'
suggestion regarding gifts has never found favor in the tax Code, perhaps because of the sepa•
rate system of estate and gift taxes.) The argument that the shareholder's benefit on liquidation should be taxable to the corporation favors consistent application of nonrecognition under
I.R.C. §§ 336 and 3 l l (nonliquidating distributions in kind).
45. It is difficult to imagine why the value in the hands of the shareholders would be different than the value to the corporation. Before liquidation a nonmarketable asset may have a
peculiarly high value to the corporation, but upon liquidation the asset must be marketable to
be of value to either the corporation or the shareholders. See note 71 i'!fi-a. On the other
hand, the asset may have special value to the shareholders, who continue the enterprise, but
this would presumably be no higher than the preliquidation value to the corporation. The
value of nonmarketable assets to be taxed could, therefore, depend upon whether the enterprise is to be continued by the shareholders.
46. See General Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); S. REP. No. 1622,
supra note 14, at 46; Molloy, supra note 39, at 56 & n.16.
41. See Arent, Rea/location ofIncome and Expenses in Connection with Formation and Liquidation of Corporations, 40 TAXES 995, 998-99 (1962):
For at least two decades the courts have been zealous in ther efforts (1) to prevent corporations from shifting their tax burdens to their shareholders and (2) to prevent avoidance
of the double tax which has been the traditional exaction for the privilege of conducting
business in the corporate form.
To allow the income to be tr_!lllsferred to the shareholder violates the judicial assignment of
income doctrine, see note 39 supra, which has been held to override§ 336, See Williamson v.
United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
48. The idea that a corporation does not realize appreciation is not an exception to the
prohibition against shifting income to shareholders, see note 39 supra, that is granted for liquidations. General lltilities, 296 U.S. 200, cited in the legislative history of§ 336, see S. REP.
1622, supra note 14, at 46, involved a nonliquidating distribution, and I.R.C. § 311 applies the
rule of§ 336 to nonliquidating distributions. Therefore the exception in §§ 311 and 336 to the
general rule against shifting corporate income to shareholders must relate to the nature of the
gain embodied in the assets, rather than the corporation's liquidation.
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e.ffecting a change in the division of the form in which that interest is
held.49 By contrast, earnings of the corporation are clearly subject to
tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels.50
The conclusion embodied in section 336 that appreciation is not
taxable to the corporation is not inescapable,51 but is justified on the
same grounds as section 351, which provides nonrecognition of gain
to individuals on transfer of assets in exchange for stock of a corporation which they will control. 52 Both provisions allow for changing
the form of enterprise without artificial tax barriers.53 If efficiency
reasons favor incorporation of a sole proprietorship (perhaps to facilitate raising capital), the incorporation might nevertheless fail to
take place without section 351 because the taxpayer would have to
forego the benefit of deferral provided by the doctrine of realization.
Section 336 similarly removes the artificial tax barriers to a change
from corporate to unincorporated form. Recognizing a gain on appreciated assets would create a tax liability that could be postponed
by continuing to function as a corporation. Thus even where efficiency reasons dictated a change, the corporation would nevertheless
continue. This rationale applies only to transfers in the ownership of
the capital assets of the corporation. The accumulated earnings of
the corporation cannot be permitted to be transferred tax-free to a
sole proprietorship without creating artificial incentives to disincorporate.54 To the extent of previous deductions from ordinary income, previously expensed assets constitute accumulated earnings,55
and should not, as a matter of rational tax policy, come under section 336.
2.

Other Nonrecognition Rationales

Aside from the special concerns evident in section 336, nonrecog49. That is, part of the shareholders' investment merely changes form from ownership of
equity shares in the corporation's capital (as opposed to earnings) to ownership of the capital
assets themselves. See notes 56-62 i,!fra.
50. See notes 39 & 47 supra. Allowing corporations to shift their income to their shareholders to escape taxation at the corporate level clearly violates the policy embodied in I.R.C.
§ 341 (collapsible corporations). See I.R.C. §§ 34l(a), (b)(l)(A).
51. The appreciation was a form of gain accruing to the corporation while it held the
assets; one view is that the corporation should no more be allowed to shift this form of income
than any other. See notes 39 & 47 supra. But see notes 53 & 63 i,!fra.
52. 1.R.C. § 351.
53. On the legislative purpose behind§ 351, see Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109
F.2d 479,488 (1st Cir. 1940) (discussing§ 112(b) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of§ 351);
Arent, supra note 47, at 996 (policy permitting flexibility in movement to the incorporated
form); Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization: The Threat of the "Potential Income" Item
and a Sensible Approach to Problems of Thinness, 40 TAXES 974, 979 (1962) (change in form
only). Arent views I.R.C. § 333 (see note 63 i,!fra) and I.R.C. § 336 as limited corollaries to
§ 351 dealing with change out of the corporate form. Arent, supra note 47, at 999.
54. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text.
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nition may be theoretically based on one of three general principles. 56 First is the notion that identity of interest between the
transferor and the transferee means that in e.ffect no transfer has
taken place. From the proposition that there has been no transfer it
follows that the basis in the property is unchanged. For gifts, for
example, the donee takes the donor's basi~ - a carryover basis. 57 It
may be reasonable to view the shareholder and the corporation as a
single interest when the corporation is created since it has no prior
existence. The transfer of the property to the corporation under section 351 divides the single interest of the individual into a personal
and corporate interest. 58 And, consistent with the assumed identity
of interest, the corporation takes a carryover basis from the transferor. 59 The situation di.ffers, however, on liquidation. Although
ownership of the capital assets of the corporation is arguably an interest common to both the corporation and its shareholders, which
may be recombined through liquidation without tax consequence,
the Code clearly establishes the corporation and its shareholders as
separate entities for taxation purposes through the double taxation of
income of corporations and shareholders. 60 Thus the transfer of
earned but untaxed corporate income to the shareholders amounts to
a transfer between distinct entities. 61
A second general theory of nonrecogntion involves the continuity
56. Even if nonrecognition would be theoretically justified under one of these principles,
the Code made it clear, at least prior to the repeal of I.R.C. § 1002, that gains were to be
recognized unless nonrecognition is explicitly provided in the Code.
57. I.R.C. § 1015(a). Note that the carryover basis is limited to fair market value at the
time of the transfer for computing losses to prevent the abuse that could result if losses could
be shifted from low bracket to high bracket taxpayers (another example of the congressional
policy against income shifting). Another exception to the carryover basis that accompanies
nonrecognition is § 1014, providing a fair market value basis to the distributees of decendent's
estates despite nonrecognition of gain to the estate. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 31, ~ 4.01, at
59. This stepped-up basis has been criticized by commentators, see H. SIMONS, supra note 23,
at 164-65, 208, and was eliminated by J.R.C. § 1023 (1976), which was, however, repealed
before it became effective. The step-up in basis allowed by§ 1014 should not extend to liquidating corporations, despite any similarities between the death of an individual and the liquidation of a corporation. The most important distinction is that death of an individual invokes
a separate system of estate taxes. In addition, the justification often given for § 1014, that
computation of the decedents basis imposes administrative burdens, would not apply to a corporation because the corporation will have much better records than most individuals. Finally, it is unlikely that Congress would view the liquidation of a corporation, which often
indicates only a change in enterprise form, as an occasion calling for the same degree of solicitude as the death of an individual.
58. See I.R.C. §§ 361,362. As in the case of gifts, the statute attempts to prevent manipulation to recognize losses.
59. I.R.C. § 362(a).
60. J.R.C. §§ 11, 6l(a)(7); B. BJTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20.
61. A second argument against viewing the corporation and its shareholders as a single
unit is the that in most situations the shareholder's basis in his equity share of the corporation
will be unrelated to the corporation's basis in its assets. An exception might be a closely held
corporation formed under§ 351, for which the corporation and the original shareholders have
the same basis in the capital assets. But even here, an identity of interest rationale would not
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of a taxpayer's investment, as exemplified by the nonrecognition of
gain in like-kind exchanges. 62 In these situations, recognition of gain
on an exchange deters efficient changes in the form of an investment.
The Code's solution is to allow nonrecognition, but require the investor to carry his basis in the old property over to the new property. 63 The continuity of investment rationale may justify
apply to accumulated earnings, unless the system of dual taxation, see notes 37 & 60 supra, is
to be ignored.
Where the shareholder is a parent corporation, it is easier to view the boundary between
the shareholder and the corporation as insubstantial. In fact, only in that situation does the
transferee take the transferor's basis. I.R.C. § 334(b)(l). In other situations, the transferee's
basis is either fair market value (after recognizing a gain to the transferee), or is derived from
his basis in the shares of stock. I.R.C. § 334(a), (c). Even where a subsidiary is liquidated by a
parent, the transferee does not always take the transferor's basis. Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), qffd per curlam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 827 (1951), established the rule, now codified at I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), that where one
corporation buys the shares of a second corporation which is promptly liquidated, the
purchase of shares is treated as a direct purchase of the subsidiary's assets, and the parent's
basis in those assets is determined by a pro rata allocation of the price paid for the stock. See
Treas. Reg.§ 1.334-l(c), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 66, 142; amended T.D. 6298, 1958-2 C.B 138;
T.D 7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176.
Where the liquidating corporation is a subsidiary and the parent takes the transferor's
basis in the assets, there is no danger of corporate earnings escaping the corporate system,
since one, and only one, corporate tax will be imposed in any event. Even so, there may be
some difference in tax liability. I.R.C. § 482 permits allocation of gains and losses to the
"right" corporation to avoid abuse, although this may be difficult in practice.
62. See I.R.C. § 1031; see, e.g., Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453,456 (2d
Cir. 1959). The nonrecognition for involuntary conversions under § 1033 can also be explained in terms of continuity of investment, although solicitude for taxpayer hardship is probably at least an equally likely motivation.
63. Ordinarily, when shareholders receive liquidating distributions, they are deemed under
§ 331 to have sold their stock in exchange for the assets received, and thus there is no question
ofa continuing investment. I.R.C. § 331(a)(l). The taxpayer recognizes a gain or loss equal to
the difference between fair market value of assets received and the shareholder's basis in the
stock, I.R.C. § 1001, and gets a basis in the assets equal to fair market value, I.R.C. § 334(a).
However, § 333 allows the shareholder not to recognize a gain on the shares on a continuity
of investment theory. I.R.C. § 333(e) provides that gain will be recognized only on that portion of the distribution which represents accumulated corporate earnings and profits,
§ 333(e)(l), and any remaining gain which is received in the form of cash or securities,
§ 333(e)(2). It seems fair to view previously expensed assets, to the extent that deductions for
them have offset income, to be viewed as a form of earnings and profits to the corporation (and
thus taxable) once the proper time for realization has arrived. Under § 333, the taxpayer's
investment in the shares and in the assets received in liquidation are viewed as a single investment, with a change in form only. Section 333 removes artificial tax barriers to liquidations of
closely held corporations in which the shareholders continue the business as one or more unincorporated sole proprietorships or partnerships. The source of§ 333 is a temporary provision
designed to relieve the hardship imposed by the rule change imposing additional tax on retained earnings of personal holding companies. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 500, 52
Stat. 557 (now I.R.C. § 541). It was believed that this latter provision would force virtually all
personal holding corporations into unincorporated form, since the tax avoidance advantage of
these corporations was eliminated, and even the normal corporate advantage of accumulating
earnings without personal tax liability was disallowed. In § 333, Congress made the temporary
relief provision permanent, despite the fact that its original purpose of avoiding the harshness
of the rule change regarding personal holding companies no longer applied. No explanation is
given for making § 333 permanent, see S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 256, but the continuity of investment rationale seems to fit. To the extent that § 333 allows nonrecognition, the
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nonrecognition of the shareholders' gain, but as noted previously, 64
the corporation's investment does not continue beyond liquidation
unless the corporation and its successor can be viewed as a single
entity. Where the investment is transferred to a new entity, it is appropriate to close all transactions and recognize the corporation's
gain.6S
A :final theory of nonrecognition involves the liquidity problem. 66
In most cases involving a transfer sufficient as an event of realization
there is no issue of liquidation of the appreciated asset; it is an accomplished fact. But in some cases, such as the reversion of rental
property improved by the lessee, 67 or discharge of indebtedness, 68
gains are realized without improving the cash position of the taxpayer. In these cases, out of concern for hardship, Congress has
granted nonrecognition, 69 with basis provisions70 to ensure that gain
is only deferred, and not permanently excluded.
In most corporate liquidation settings, the imposition of tax will
not force the liquidation of a going concern.71 Where the corporation's business will continue through its successors in interest, there
taxpayer carries over his basis in his shares. I.R.C. § 334(c). Basis is adjusted to reflect gains
recognized under the exceptions to the general rule of nonrecognition.
64. See notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
65. While it may seem somewhat arbitrary to distinguish between corporation's and share•
holders' gain, the distinction is necessary unless manipulation to avoid the double taxation of
dividends is to be permitted.
66. See notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text.
61. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (holding that a taxpayer realizes gain on
the receipt of his reversionary interest with improvements made by the lessee). But see I.R.C.
§ 109 (providing nonrecognition unless improvements amount to rent).
68. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931) (holding that a taxpayer
realizes gain when indebtedness is discharged). Bui see I.R.C. § 108(a)(l)(C) (providing deferral by offsetting favorable tax attributes against discharge of indebtedness income).
69. I.R.C. § 109 provides that income does not include income attributable to improvements by the lessee which are received when the lease is terminated. However, this provision
does not apply where the gain amounts to rent.
I.R.C. §108 excludes gain from discharge of indebtedness for insolvent debtors or electing
business debtors. I.R.C. § 108(a)(l)(C), (d)(4).
70. See I.R.C. §§ 108(b), 108(c), 1019. I.R.C. § 1017(d) ensures that the basis reduction
taken upon discharge of indebtedness is recovered as ordinary income (and not converted to
capital gain by the sale of an asset whose basis has been reduced under § 108).
71. Since the going concern is being liquidated in any event, little hardship is likely to
result from having to sell the asset to pay the tax on the gain. One hardship could arise where
the gain associated with a previous expense deduction is inseverable from another capital asset
of the corporation. For example, in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837
(9th Cir. 1963), the previously expensed item was improvements to land to prepare it for a
potato crop. The gain to the corporation under the theory advanced in this Note arises when
the corporation has the benefit of the improvements and is relieved of the obligation to use
those improvements in the trade or business. But since this benefit is inextricably tied to the
land, the value of the benefit depends on the increment to the value of the land due to the
improvements. If, as in South Lake Farms, the land is transferred to a potato farmer, the full
value of the improvements presumably represents an addition to the land's value. If, however,
the land were sold to a developer, the preparation for the potato crop would presumably have
added nothing to the value of the land, and the corporation's benefit would be zero.
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is reason for solicitude which would justify deferral, but not p·ermanent exclusion, of the tax liability. Since in most liquidation settings
the transferee takes a stepped-up basis,72 nonrecognition would result in exclusion rather than deferral of the tax. Thus nonrecognition in these situations would result in greater relief than Congress
has been willing to give in other hardship nonrecognition settings, 73
and should be denied absent clear evidence of congressional intent.
To summarize Part I, the corporation gains when assets are expensed and not consumed, and this gain is realized upon liquidation.
Neither the apparent purpose of Congress in passing section 336 nor
the theoretical rationale for that or other nonrecognition sections justifies nonrecognition of the gain that results from the previous expense treatment. 74 The remaining question is whether,
notwithstanding these theoretical arguments, the Code mandates
that the distribution of previously expensed assets not be taxed.
72. See note 61 supra. I.R.C. § 334(b)(l) (liquidation of subsidiary not recently acquired)
is the exception, and there would be little potential for abuse if nonrecognition applied there.
There is an argument that in liquidations covered by§ 334(b)(2) there is no real difference
between recognizing or not recognizing the gain on expensed assets, because of the rules for
determining basis. This argument is best illustrated with an example. Assume the entire net
assets of the subsidiary consist of$100 worth of previously expensed property, and the parent
acquires its stock (plus any tax liabilities) for $50 paid to the shareholder. If the subsidiary is
forced to recognize the $100 gain, the parent's basis would be computed as follows: $50 for the
price paid for the stock plus $50 (approximately) for the tax liability of the subsidiary assumed,
Treas. Reg. § l.334-l(c)(4)(v)(a)(l), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61, amended T.D. 6298, 1958-2
C.B. 138, T.D. 7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176, plus a refinement of approximately $50 to account for
earnings and profits accumulated after the purchase of the subsidiary's stock and before liquidation. In R.M. Smith v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 317 (1977), qjfd, 591 F.2d 248 (3rd Cir.
1979), the court concluded (questionably) that recapture constituted interim earnings and profits under regulation. The parent pays out $50, incurs tax liability on $100 and gets property
worth $100 plus the ability to deduct $150 as an expense for the consumption of the property.
Netting out the tax liability on $100 with the deductions of $150 gives a net deduction of $50
(assuming both corporations pay tax at the same rate).
If instead there were no recapture tax liability, the parent buys the stock for $50 and takes a
deductible basis of $50.
There are two flaws in this argument. First, it assumes the correctness of the result in.R. M.
Smith. Second, even if that case is correct, the analysis described above applies only if the
entire amount of the additions to basis for tax liability and interim earnings and profits are
allocable to expensable assets. If the recapture tax liability were viewed as a lien, then the
addition to basis would be applied directly to the previous expensed assets. Treas. Reg.
§ l.334-l(c)(4)(viii), T.D. 6152, 1955-2 C.B. 61, amended T.D. 6298, 1958-2 C.B. 138, T.D.
7231, 1973-1 C.B. 176. But since the tax liability on previously expensed assets is the result of
previous deductions against income unrelated to the specific property, the adjustment should
more reasonably be allocated over all property, including capital and nondepreciable assets.
See Morrison, Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidations, 54
TAXES 902, 919-20 (1976); O'Hare, Application of tax benefit rule in new case threatens certain
liquidations, 44 J. TAX. 200, 202-203 (1976). See generally Forte, supra note 6.
73. Except in the case of death. See I.R.C. § 1014.
74. Because of the carryover basis in liquidations under§ 334(b)(l), there is deferral, but
not exemption from tax. Further, even if income_ is shifted, it remains in the corporate system
and within the overall structure of the same parent corporation. A requirement to realize and
recognize gains upon changes solely in corporate form may erect a tax barrier to efficient
reorganization. I.R.C. § 482 (permitting allocation of income and deductions) is adequate to
prevent abuse.
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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

Part I argues that, as a matter of tax policy, a corporation should
pay the applicable tax on the value of previously expensed assets
distributed in liquidation, up to a maximum of the amount resulting
in a previous tax benefit. C<;>ngress could surely achieve this result,
and has come close to adopting appropriate legislation. 75 Whether a
court can derive such a rule through a principled exercise of legal
method poses a more difficult question. The apparently unequivocal
language of section 336 presents an obvious obstacle. Even on its
face, however, that language may apply only to gains that result
from asset appreciation and not to tax benefits. From the available
evidence, Congress clearly seems to have intended this result. And
regardless of the interpretation given to section 336, section 111 may
affirmatively impose the tax benefit rule· to previously expensed assets distributed in liquidation. This Part explores these ambiguities
and contradictions in the Code, and concludes that the statute does
not forbid, and may require, applying the tax benefit rule in this situation. The court should not hesitate to adopt a reasonable construction of the Code that fulfills fundamental tax policies that alternative
constructions completely disregard.
A. The Language of Section 336

Section 336 provides that "no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
corporation on the distribution of property in partial or complete
liquidation." 76 This wording might appear to preclude taxation of
the corporation's gain from the deduction of the cost of assets not
ultimately consumed in the course of business, but rather distributed
upon liquidation. The courts have struggled with similar language,
attempting to exclude previously expensed assets from its scope. 77
Precisely understood, however, even a literal interpretation of the
75. H.R. 10,936, 94th Congress, introduced Dec. 10, 1975, would have extended § 1245
recapture to previously expensed assets. The bill was passed by the House, but the Congress
adjourned in 1976 before the Senate had time to act on the bill. See Armagost, Assets /he Sale
of Which May Trigger /he Recognition of Gain in Sec/ion 337 Liquidations, 29 S. CAL. TAX
INST. 375, 446-48 (1977). Committee reports to both houses of Congress favored passage of the
bill. See S. REP. No. 1346, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1350, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976).
76. I.R.C. § 336.
77. For example, in Anders v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d 1283 {10th Cir. 1969), the court
considered the meaning of the similar "gain on property" language used in § 337. See notes
13-14 supra. Given the purpose of§ 337 to provide consistent results for distribution of assets
or proceeds, see note 14 supra, judicial approaches to § 337 are highly relevant to interpretation of§ 336.
Based on structural similarities between the definitions of "property" in § 337 and of "capital asset" in§ 1221, the court concluded that "property" in § 336 means capital assets. 414
F.2d at 1285, 1287. The court reasoned that even if a transaction involves disposition, its
proceeds need not be treated as a gain on sale. The expense treatment did not produce a
depreciated basis, which is required in computing a gain on sale. 414 F.2d at 1288. Since
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section need not bar application of the tax benefit rule to previously
expensed assets distributed in liquidation.
The section's scope will vary with the meaning attributed to the
word "on." If "on" refers to any gain which accrues to the corporation at the time of the liquidation,78 the section's nonrecognition provision would encompass previously expensed assets, because the
corporation does not realize a net tax benefit until liquidation ensures that the expensed assets will not be consumed as contemplated
by the deduction of their original cost. In a temporal sense, tax benefits and asset appreciation are indistinguishable in relation to the
time of the liquidation. Given that Congress plainly intended not to
recognize "any gain" on asset appreciation, a temporal interpretation
of "on" would therefore require nonrecognition of the tax benefit
accrued through the distribution of previously expensed assets.
But "on" may also assume a causal significance, and it is this
meaning of the worcl which seems to correspond most precisely with
its statutory use. 79 If "any gain on the distribution" of the assets
refers to those gains which arise from the distribution following liquidation, a court could reasonably exclude the tax benefit gained
from the distribution of previously expensed assets from the sc_ope of
section 336. The gain "on" the distribution would then refer only to
any appreciation in the value of the assets themselves, for the tax
benefit conferred by the deduction of their original cost accrues to
the corporation whether or not liquidation ultimately takes place.
The corporation does not realize that gain until the offsetting expectation of consuming the expensed assets is discharged by liquidation,
expensed items have no basis, and are by definition not capital assets, neither the capital gains
model nor § 337 apply, according to this argument.
This approach is unpersuasive, since the similarities between the definitions of property in
§§ 337 and 1221 are at best superficial. In following the Anders decision, the Tax Court has
relied more _on the overall structure of the Code and the legislative history to conclude that
§ 337 applies to appreciation of assets, and not to gains based on prior deductions from ordinary income. See Commissioner v. Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). While technically
correct, this conclusion does not justify rejecting § 336 as facially inapplicable to diposition in
liquidation of previously expensed assets.
78. "A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). "On" can mean "occurrence during," AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 917 (1978), so that any gain to the corporation during the liquidation and distribution, including the windfall generated by previous
expense treatment of distributed assets, should not be recognized under § 336. See, e.g., VII
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 114 (1933).
79. "On" may also "indicate an originating or sustaining source of agency; live on bread
and water; make a profit on gambling." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 917 (1978). The OED gives a more precise sense of this meaning as used in the
statute: "Indicating that which forms the basis of income, taxation, borrowing, betting, profit,
or loss." VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 115 (1933). This seems the most reasonable
applicable definition, and suggests that § 336 applies only to gains for which the liquidation
"forms the basis of income." This plainly does not encompass the tax benefit from the prior
deduction, which the corporation enjoys whether or not it ultimately liquidates.
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but this, like the fiction of consumption at the time of deduction
which gives rise to the windfall in the first place, is an accounting
convention rather than an event of economic significance. 80 Since
the gain, ie., the tax benefit, represented by the value of the expensed assets, 81 resulted from the original purchase of the assets and
the subsequent deduction of their cost, a court could reasonably conclude that such an accession to wealth amounts to a gain "on" the
deduction of the cost of the assets, realized rather than engendered
by the liquidation.
B.

Congressional Intent

Several extrinsic indicia of congressional intent support this interpretation of section 336. First, the parallel interpretation of section 33782 . strengthens the case for excluding previously expensed
assets from nonrecognition under section 336. Since sections 337
and 336 attempt to provide identical tax treatment in this context, 83
the two should be consistently construed where possible. 84 Congress
80. This interpretation was adopted in the § 337 context by the Third Circuit in Hempt
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1180 (3d Cir. 1974). The court held that§ 337 does
not apply to transactions that have significance independent of the act of liquidation. The
benefit to the taxpayer of appreciation of property has no tax consequences except upon sale,
and the gain is clearly a "gain on sale." For previously expensed assets, however, the benefit to
the taxpayer relates to the initial expense treatment, and the liquidating sale is merely a convenient time to realize the gain. This view is consistent with the position taken in Part I that the
foreclosure of any possibility of consumption in trade or business, and not the disposition
itself, is the event of realization of gain to the corporation. Indeed, the court in Hemp/ Bros.
reached this result on tax policy grounds, rather than as the result of any involved textual
exegesis of§ 337. But implicit in this result is the attribution of causal significance to "on," a
meaning which seems, even based on the text alone, more reasonable than the temporal
alternative.
·
81. It should be noted that the market value of the assets is relevant only as the statutory
measure of the tax benefit conferred by the failure to consume them. Under§ 111, recovery of
amounts previously deducted is taxed up to a maximum of the amount which gave rise to a tax
benefit, since any loss suffered on the purchase and distribution of the assets amounts to an
actual business expense of the sort for which the deduction was taken. To the extent a gain is
realized beyond the amount which gave rise to a tax benefit, the accession to wealth represented arises from actual asset appreciation clearly within the ambit of § 336, and would not
exist if the assets were ultimately consumed as originally intended rather than distributed in
liquidation. This merely reexpresses the distinction between gains "on" the purchase of the
assets and gains "on" their distribution; the gains causally attributable to purchase are not
gains "on" the distribution, while gains causally attributable to the distribution, i.e., asset appreciation, are not recognized by the force of§ 336. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., cases cited in note 15 supra; see note 14 supra.
83. See note 14 supra.
84. There are express differences between the two sections, but only where required by the
fundamental differences between proceeds and property. For example, § 337 deals with involuntarily converted property, which by definition cannot be distributed in kind. Section 337's
exceptions for sale (other than in bulk) of stock in trade and for collapsible corporations are
necessary because these sales would represent income in the ordinary course of business, rather
than a mere distribution of unappreciated property. See note 18 supra.
None of the§ 337 holdings, see note l4supra, has specifically followed a presumed§ 336
result. But see Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 680-81 (1975) (Tannenwald, J.,
concurring) (§ 337 should be governed by law applicable to § 336); Midland-Ross Corp. v.
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has had years to correct any misinterpretation entailed by these decisions; its failure to act reinforces the conclusion that the tax benefit
rule applies under these circumstances. 85
Second, as both courts and commentators have recognized, these
sections reflect no intention to provide nonrecognition for any gains
or losses other than those resulting from asset appreciation or depreciation. 86 The legislative history of section 336 plainly supports this
conclusion; 87 the section derives from a Treasury Regulation providing nonrecognition "however [the assets] may have appreciated or
depreciated in value since their acquisition."88 This history does not
suggest any intention to sanction the sort of windfall that would result from the untaxed distribution of previously expensed assets.
Finally, the structure of the Code, and particularly the enumerated exceptions to section 336, suggest that Congress intended it to
apply to appreciation, and not to "gain" that results from prior tax
treatment. Although none of the three statutory exceptions to section 336(a)89 applies to previously expensed assets, two of those exUnited States, 485 F.2d 110, 118 (6th Cir. 1973). Whether the courts have tacitly assumed that
the tax benefit rule would override § 336 or that some disparity in treatment under the two
sections is acceptable is not clear.
85. Legislative acquiescence to a judicial interpretation is probative of the interpretation's
consonance with congressional will. "When a court says to a legislature: •you (or your predecessor) meant X,' it almost invites the legislature to answer 'We did not.'" G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31-32 (1982).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed this view of legislative adoption of judicial
interpretations through the refusal to change the statute in question. See Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982) (''the fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant amendment of the CEA left intact ·the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action is itself evidence that
Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that remedy"); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
580-81 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.").
After such a major revision of the Internal Revenue Code as the Economic Recovery Tax Act
of 1981, it is not unreasonable to view the prevailing interpretations of the unchanged portions
of the Code, including§§ 336 and 337, as having been ratified by the legislative branch.
86. See Arent, supra note 47, at 1001 (citing S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 258-59);
Lyon, Ordinary Income May Arise in Section 337 Sale Under Assignment of Income .Doctrine,
16 J. TAXATION 2, 3 (1962) (')lnderlying purpose related only to asset appreciation"); O'Hare,
supra note 6, at 236.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, su_pra note
14, at 258.
88. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-20 (1953) provides that "[n]o gain or loss is realized by a
corporation from the mere distribution of its assets in kind in partial or complete liquidation
however they may have appreciated or depreciated in value since their acquisition." See
Broenan, supra note 6, at 236.
89. I.R.C. § 336(a) explicitly excludes installment obligations. These are excluded on the
assignment of income principle, which is a tax doctrine forbidding income earned by one taxpayer to be assigned to a second taxpayer and taxed at the second taxpayer's rate. See B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, ~ 1.05, at 1-18; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment ofIncome:
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. Rev. 293 (1962). Installment
obligations represent inchoate income already earned by the corporation, and not "property."
See note 39 supra. The other two exceptions, for LIFO and depreciation recapture amounts,
are discussed in notes 90-94 infra and accompanying text.
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ceptions are closely related to the prior expense problem. Section
336(b) excludes a "LIFO recapture amount" 90 from the general nonrecognition rule of section 336 when the last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory accounting method has been used. Compared to the first-in,
first-out (FIFO) method, the LIFO method overstates (in a period of
rising costs) the cost basis of assets sold or consumed out of inventory, with a concomitant understatement of taxable income and of
the basis of the remaining inventory. Thus for the LIFO inventory,
as for the previously expensed asset, a component of the excess in
asset value realized results from accounting methods that overstate
the cost of assets actually consumed in each tax year91 and thus understate income for those years. Section 336(b), as well as section
3ll{b), which provides the same treatment for nonliquidating distributions, reflects a policy against extending nonrecognition to this
type of gain, which is in essence deferred ordinary income. 92
Section 1245 reveals a similar congressional policy with respect
to disposition of assets on which depreciation deductions have been
allowed. As in the case of LIFO inventory, the difference between
fair mar~et value (or sale price) and adjusted basis in part results
from the prior allowance of depreciation in excess of true cost. 93 The
recapture of this amount under section 1245 is excluded from the
application of section 336.94 The dissent in Tennessee-Carolina suggests a distinction between depreciation and expense deductions,
90. I.R.C. § 336(b). The LIFO recapture amount is the excess of the inventory value calculated by the FIFO method over the value calculated by the LIFO method. I.R.C. § 336(b)(3).
91. See notes 26, 27, 40 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
92. Whether LIFO or FIFO more accurately reflects the cost of assets consumed is debatable. LIFO measures the replacement cost of assets used, whereas FIFO requires the user to
realize the appreciation (assuming rising costs) of assets acquired earlier by using them first.
Whichever approach one finds more persuasive, the Code's LIFO recapture provisions indicate that Congress views FIFO as representing economic reality. In contrast, there is no doubt
that the existence of expensed assets represents deductions that, in aggregate, have exceeded
consumption.
93. Professor Kahn argues that accelerated depreciation is not unnecessary or excessive,
even when later market value exceeds the adjusted basis. See Kahn,Acce/erated JJepreciatlon.
Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowancefar Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. I (1979).
Professor Kahn's argument is that the accelerated depreciation accurately reflects an allocation
of the cost of the asset that might be made at the time of purchase, whereas the later market
value of the asset reflects the fact that use of the asset near the end of its life, which was heavily
discounted in the a priori allocation of cost, is, at the time of resale, closer at hand and thus
worth more. In this sense, the difference between market value and adjusted basis is a gain
derived from holding a capital asset over a period of time, and thus should be subjected to
capital gains treatment (the result before the enactment of§ 1245), and not ordinary income
treatment (the result under § 1245). Whether or not Professor Kahn is correct, § 1245 indicates
that Congress intends to tax as ordinary income gains that are the result of what it believes are
unrealistic deductions against prior years' ordinary income rather than appreciation. There is
little doubt that expensed assets which are not consumed or do not otherwise become worthless
fall into the category of unrealistic cost deductions.
94. See I.R.C. § 1245(b)(3) (excluding transactions in which the transferee takes the transferor's basis under I.R.C. §§ 332, 351 and 361, among others, but not mentioning §§ 336 or
337).
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without elaborating on why the two should be distinguished. 95
While the Code provisions for depreciation existing at the time of
Tennessee-Carolina referred to an allowance for wear and tear96
rather than recovery of a direct cost permitted by the expense deduction, the new section 16897 makes clear that depreciation deductions
constitute a form of cost recovery, distinguishable from expense deductions only in terms of timing. Further, an election to expense
depreciable property under section 179 subjects the taxpayer to recapture liability under section 1245.98 It is unlikely that Congress
intended that similar types of cost recovery deductions should be
treated differently. More probably, Congress simply saw no ne~d to
deal with nondepreciable assets since they are presumed to be consumed when expensed. The LIFO and depreciation recapture exclusions from section 336 imply that Congress intended to accord
nonrecognition only to actual asset appreciation.
This evidence of congressional intent may prove persuasive even
if the proposed interpretation of the language of section 336 is rejected. While revenue acts may be subject to a rule of strict construction,99 the interpretation of any statute has the purpose of fulfilling,
in some sense, the purposes of the legislature. 10° Courts have occasionally declined to look beyond the statutory language absent obscurity or ambiguity, 101 but this mechanical approach can only
increase the difficulty of determining the legislative will. 102 Evidence
95. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 454 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). Tannenwald cites Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A.
1074 (1933), affd., 72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934), for the proposition that expenses and depreciation deductions are fundamentally different. At issue was whether player contracts with an
option clause should be expensed or amortized over three years, but the question was decided
merely on the basis of the useful life of the contract in view of the option clause. Thus only the
timing of the deduction, and no more fundamental distinction, appears t'! have been involved.
96. See I.R.C. § I67(a) (reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear, obsolescence).
97. I.R.C. § 168 (Accelerated Cost Recovery System). This section applies to most forms
of depreciable property put in service after December 31, 1980. I.R.C. § 168{c){l).
98. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2)(D); see I.R.C. § 179; note 3 supra.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 187-88 (1923).
100. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) ("As in
all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of
the purposes Congress sought to serve"); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our
objective in a case such as this is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the
legislative will"). Given the confluence of tax policy and congressional intent in this area,
subtle distinctions between legislative purpose, intent, and the policies underlying legislation
are not relevant to the interpretation of the Code sections implicated by distribution of previously expensed assets.
101. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980) ("the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent
a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."); Arizona v. Maypenny, 608 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1979) ("clear and
unequivocal language" is "determinative" of statute's construction).
102. See Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455,464 (1934):
The rule that where the statute contains no ambiguity, it must be taken literally and given
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of legislative intent can inform the interpretation of the statutory
language, 103 and in some cases even override it. 104 Given the purpose of the judicial inquiry, such a result reflects a truer fidelity to
legislation than does strict literalism, provided that the extrinsic evidence relied on by the court is more probative of congressional intent than the statutory language. While such situations arise
infrequently, legislative drafting remains an inexact science, whose
precision and clarity do not approach their apex in the Code. 105
Even if the Court finds the literal meaning of section 336 inconsistent
with the evident intent of Congress, the better course would be to
vindicate the policy judgment of the legislative branch rather than
statutory wording which fails to reflect it.
C.

Conflict with Section 111

In addition to doubts regarding the applicability of section 336 to
"recoveries" of previously expensed assets, a potential conflict exists
between sections 111 and 336. Section 111 textually refers solely to
exclusions from income where no prior tax benefi~ has accrued, and
therefore cannot directly conflict with a nonrecognition provision.
But section 111 negatively implies that where a recovery has been
the subject of a prior tax benefit, the amount recovered is includible
effect according to its language is a sound one not to be put aside to avoid hardships that
may sometimes result from giving effect to the legislative purpose. . • . But the expounding of a statutory provision strictly according to the latter without regard to other
parts of the Act and legislative history would often defeat the object intended to be
accomplished.
103. The plain meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a rule oflaw, and does
not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists." Boston Sand Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (per Holmes, J.); see Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 7~7, 739 (2d
Cir.), qffd., 326 U.S. 404 (1945) (per L. Hand, J.) ("it is one of the surest indexes of a mature
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympthetic and imaginative
discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."). The vitality of these principles is evident
from their recent citation in Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).
104. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259,266 (1981) ("The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of
co=on meaning to have their literal effect"). For examples involving the Code, see Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissentjng) ("Here we have the most
persuasive kind of evidence that Congress did not mean the language in controversy, however
plain it may be to the ordinary user of English, to have the ordinary meaning"); Corn Products
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (broadening the exceptions to § 1221 (§
117(a) of the 1939 Code) beyond their literal language); Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468
(1939) (holding that for purposes of casualty losses not connected with trade or business, now
I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), the basis rule, now in§ 165(b), must be modified to account for the decline
in value while in non-business use).
105. As Justice Brennan has laconically observed with regard to applying the plain meaning rule to the Code, ''the meaning of the 1954 Code, however, is anything but plain." Fulman
v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 563 n.7 (1978). Of greater relevance to § 336, Judge Friendly
has candidly admitted that "[t]he corporate liquidation provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code, with their involuted cross-references, are not for reading by him who runs; to the layman they have no meaning, either plain or fancy. They are for reading by lawyers, and primarily tax lawyers at that." J.C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1962).
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as income. This inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule has been
acknowledged by courts as the basis for overruling other nonrecognition provisions, and is bolstered by the fact that the congressional
reports on the 1954 Code describe section 111 as "relating to the
inclusion of amounts attributable to the recovery of bad debts,
etc." 106 Thus although the specific Code language does not conflict
directly with section 336, longstanding case authority plus Congress'
own description of the section indicates a conflict that requires judicial resolution.
For section 111 to conflict with section 336, the requisite "recovery" to invoke section 111 must exist. The Code does not define "recovery," and the Treasury Regulations define the term only by
illustrations such as "amounts received" or "cancellation of taxes accrued."107 The majority in Tennessee-Carolina suggested three possible theories of "recovery:" (a) sale or exchange; (b) end of need; and
(c) a fictional "recovery" of the assets which were fictionally "consumed" when the expense deduction was allowed. None of these
theories is analytically satisfying, but the reasons put forward by the
court to justify them suggest a theory of recovery consistent with the
policy analysis developed in Part I. This alternative theory includes
the accession to income resulting from the distribution of previously
expensed assets within the category of "recoveries," not by analogy
to the transactional form of familiar types of recovery, but by direct
appeal to the policies supporting the tax benefit rule.
If the corporation sold the previously expensed assets immediately prior to liquidation, the sale would unquestionably represent a
"recovery." 108 Two theories exist for viewing the distribution of the
assets directly to the shareholders as, in e:ffect, a sale or exchange.
First, the Sixth Circuit majority suggested that the distributed assets
were exchanged for the corporation's stock which, prior to retirement, had a fair market value. 109 But irrespective of the market
value of the stock, it is worth nothing to the corporation. The corporation can make no use of the stock other than to retire it, and the
market value of the stock has no effect on a liquidating corporation.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the portion of the market
value of the stock allocated to the previously expensed assets would
106. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A36 (1954); accord S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1954).; see cases cited in note 14 supra (overriding I.R.C. § 337); Nash v.
United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) (refusing to apply the tax benefit rule in the§ 351 context, but
only because the Court found no "recovery" sufficient to bring the rule into play); note 115
infra and accompanying text.
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.lll-l(a)(2) (1956).
108. In this situation, there is an "amount received," see Treas. Reg.§ 1.111-l(a)(2), supra
note 107, that was the subject of a prior deduction, see I.R.C. § 1.111-l(a)(l) (1956). The cases
cited at note 12 supra indicate that I.R.C. § 337 would not provide nonrecognition in the case
of previously expensed assets.
109. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978).
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equal their cost. Thus even if the distribution in redemption of stock
is an exchange, the amount of the previous deduction would not
measure the amount realized on the expensed assets.
A second theory for treating a distribution as a sale was provided
inKimbell-.Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 110 which treated a
corporation purchasing all of the stock in a second corporation and
immediately liquidating the newly acquired subsidiary as having
purchased the assets of the second corporation directly, therefore allowing a stepped-up basis in those assets. 111 The step-up in basis led
the majority in Tennessee-Carolina to view the assets as if the new
subsidiary had sold them. 112 However, if the assets were sold, the
sale was by the shareholders, through the sale of their shares. By
exercising this choice, the shareholders e.ffectively liquidated the corporation. Thus the acquired corporation may be viewed as having
distributed the assets to shareholders who then sold them, 113 but it
makes no sense to view the corporation as having sold the assets, at
least as long as the shareholders acted in their private capacities. 114
Thus the stepped-up basis allowed under the Kimbell-.Diamond rule
does not justify treatment of a liquidating distribution of assets as, in
effect, a sale.
An alternative recovery argument in Tennessee-Carolina involves
the "end of need" argument, borrowed from a series of cases concerning bad debt reserves, that culminated with Nash v. United
States. 115 In these cases, the taxpayer .took a deduction for a bad
110. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), qffd. per curium, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827
{1951).
Ill. See note 61 supra.
112. 582 F.2d at 382.
113. The separate identities of the corporation and shareholders preclude collapsing these
two steps into a single step even under the step transaction doctrine. Ignoring the separate
identities would undermine the assignment of income arguments made at note 39 supra, but
perhaps not fatally, since one could argue that income of shareholders as shareholders should
not be shifted to the same people as individuals.
114. Although a contrary result might be reached if the officer/shareholders act in their
corporate capacities, the congressional intent embodied in § 337 is in effect a presumption that
the actions of shareholders in the liquidating setting are in their personal, rather than corpo•
rate, capacities. See note 14supra. A different rule for shareholders acting in their corporate
capacities (particularly for closely held corporations) would resurrect the problems that § 337
was intended to resolve. However, it is acknowledged that§ 337 has not eliminated•all difficulties that tum on the capacity in which an officer/shareholder acts. See, e.g., B. BtTIKER &
J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, at ~~ 11.63, 11.68, 11.69 (indicating that the issue of capacity is
raised in non-liquidating distributions and liquidating distributions which fail to meet the formal requirements of§ 337).
115. 398 U.S. I (1970). Nash is not as favorable to either side in Tennessee-Carolina as the
authors of the opinions imply. See 65 T.C. at 449, 451. The issue in Nash was whether a
transfer of accounts receivable to a corporation qualified for nonrecognition under I.R.C.
§ 351 when the transferor had taken a deduction for a bad debt reserve. The Service claimed
that the end ofneed for the bad debt reserve was a recovery taxable under I.R.C. § 111. As the
dissent pointed out in Tennessee-Carolina, Nash rejected the "end of need" as an event requiring taxation of the previous debt reserve deduction. 398 U.S. at 4. But the Nash Court did not
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debt reserve, against which actual bad debts were debited when receivables became uncollectable. 116 The balance of the bad debt reserve is treated as income once it is no longer needed. But in each
case, the amount taxed was limited to the amount of the reserve not
actually used, and in each case the courts taxed only amounts viewed
as actually having been recovered. 117 The bad debt reserve, unlike
the expense deduction, is specifically authorized as an exception to
the annual accounting principle to allow a provisional deduction
which will be reevaluated to reflect later events. 118 Thus although
the end-of-need rationale might add to the policy arguments favoring liquidation as an appropriate time of realization, the cases that
have developed this doctrine do not provide explicit authority for a
judicial imposition of the tax benefit rule without some identifiable
current gain. The Court in Nash seems to imply that the nonrecognition provided by section 351 would have been overriden if there
had been an actual recovery, but it clearly rejected "end of need"
without more as a form of "recovery." 119
The final theory of recovery advanced by the majority in Tennessee-Carolina treats the assets as constructively consumed at the time
of the expense deduction. 120 The existence of the assets at the time
of liquidation amounts to the "receipt" of equivalent new assets. Alhold that where the end of need is accompanied by an actual recovery, the amount recovered
is taxable notwithstanding the nonrecognition provision of§ 35 I, although the Court seems to
have assumed that it would be. See note 119 i,!fra. In effect, the Court found that the need for
• the debt reserve had not terminated, but instead became a reality rather than a prediction
when the receivables were transferred at their net (rather than face) value. The majority in
Tennessee-Carolina infers from Nash that if the net market value of the receivables had exceeded their face value less the debt reserve, the excess would be taxable. 65 T.C. at 449. The
dissent insists that the inference only follows if there is some exchange providing the transferor
of the receivables with a receipt of cash or the discharge of a liability. Nash does not specify
what sort of "recovery" must accompany the "end of need" to impose tax liability, and this is
the crucial issue separating the majority and minority views of the case.
116. Alternatively, debts would be deducted as they became worthless. I.R.C. § 166(a).
See I.R.C. § 166(c).
117. See, e.g., Citizens Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 751, 756-57 (3d Cir.
1972); Estate of Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 113 (9th Cir. 1966); West Seattle
Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. First State Bank
of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004, 1005 (5th Cir. 1948); Citizens Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. of Cleveland v. United States, 290 F.2d 932,937 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Where an actual recovery has occurred
(or has been assumed) the courts have not hesitated to except the recovery from nonrecgnition
provisions on tax benefit grounds:
This is not a case of the appreciation of an asset realized at the time of sale. Rather the
sale of the asset has freed a particular charge against capital which, having been derived
from income, must be returned to income. Such a determination does not do violence to
the meaning or purpose of section 337.
Citizens Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. of Cleveland v. United States, 290 F.2d 932, 936 (ct. cl.
1961).
118. I.R.C. § 166(c); Treas. Reg.§ 1.166-4, T.D.-6403, 1959-2 C.B. 77.
119. 398 U.S. at 4-5. This dicta supports the view that the negative inference of section 111
can indeed override nonrecognition provisions.
120. 582 F.2d at 382; 65 T.C. at 447.
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though this approach resembles in its effect the theoretical argument
advanced in Part I of this Note, as the Tennessee-Carolina dissenters
correctly pointed out, the tax laws should be concerned with actual,
not fictional, gain. 121 Nevertheless, the similar argument in Part I,
based on actual, rather than constructive, recovery at the time of liquidation will in most cases accomplish the result sought by the Tennessee-Carolina majority. 122
An alternative theory of "recovery" can be advanced which,
while similar to the arguments made by the court in Tennessee-Carolina, is more in keeping with the Code and prior case authority. The
Code clearly provides that dispositions of assets other than sales or
exchanges can represent current income. 123 Section 1245, which is,
in effect, an inclusionary tax benefit rule for "recovery" of depreciation expenses, 124 indicates that any disposition of assets can be a "recovery'' where the assets embody an element of unrecognized gain
not attributable to appreciation. 125 Section 1245 explicitly authorizes
review of past depreciation deductions to detect that element of unrealized gain. Although section 1245 does not apply to expensed
items, 126 no such express authorization is required, because the examination of past tax consequences to determine the character of
121. 582 F.2d at 385; 65 T.C. at 450.
122. See note 129 i'!fra.
123. That is, although gains under I.R.C. § IOOl{b) include only money and property received (extended by Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980) to include discharge of liabilities), other
types of gains have been recognized upon disposition of the property. In addition to the relatively recent recapture provisions, see note 124 infra, gains on property dispositions involving
no receipt of property or discharge of any liability of the transferor have long been recognized
under the doctrine of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947) (upon disposition of property
subject to nomecourse debt, amount realized includes amount of debt). Crane itself was limited to situations where the nomecourse debt was less than the value of the property, 331 U.S.
at 14 n.37, and may therefore be explainable on the basis that the debtor would treat the debt
as if he were personally liable. But other courts have applied Crane where the property is
worthless, see Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978), and it could not have been argued that the transferor is relieved of any personal liability. The result in Millar is justifiable on the same grounds as the result in United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931), discussed at note 27 supra: the taxpayer was excused
from taxation on the loan proceeds because of the presumed need to pay the loan back (despite
the lack of personal liability). When repayment is no longer a real possibility, it is appropriate
to tax the original receipt of the loan proceeds. But see Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that there is no economic benefit at the time of disposition of worthless
property subject to nomecourse debt).
124. 1.R.C. § 1245. See O'Hare, supra note 6, at 216. The regulations ·under § 111 had
specifically excluded recovery of depreciation from the application of the statutory tax benefit
rule, thus requiring a specific provision. See '.freas. Reg. § I.I II-l(a) (1956).
125. According to Professor Kahn's argument, even the excess of the fair market value of
the asset over the depreciated basis, as opposed to the original cost, represents a form of appre•
ciation. See note 93 supra. But it is clear that Congress views only the excess over original cost
as appreciation. The rest of the excess over depreciated basis is viewed as a recovery of ordinary income, to the extent it offsets against ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(2).
126. See I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3), 263(a)(2); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
528 (Ct.CL 1973) (holding that expensed assets are not § 48 property, and are consequently
§ 1245 property); Reveley & Pratt, supra note 6 at 419, arguing that§ 1245 should provide an
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current transactions is precisely the function of section 111. Part I
has argued that, by analogy to Kirby Lumber, the end of the expectation of consuming previously expensed assets in a trade or business
constitutes an event of realization of gain to the corporation. 127 The
Code's definition of income 128 is broad enough to encompass this
gain, and the definition of "recovery" in the Treasury Regulations,
including as it does cancellation of tax liability, is clearly not limited
to actual receipts of cash. Given the example of section 1245's willingness to impose tax to correct for excessive deductions, an expansive interpretation of "recovery" is certainly justified as a means of
serving the same purpose. 129 This approach does no more than recognize that the policies underlying the tax benefit rule apply to previously expensed assets distributed in liquidation, and that the
statutory expression of those policies permits their judicial vindication in this situation.
CONCLUSION

There is an element of gain inherent in assets which have been
expensed, but not yet consumed. The time_ of liquidation is an appropriate time to recognize this gain. Notwithstanding the annual
accounting principle, the tax benefit rule in its traditional form permits examination of past tax treatment of the assets to determine the
amount of this element of gain at the time ofrealization. Neither the
analogy for recapturing prior expensed deductions under tax benefit principles. See also note
75 supra.
127. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
128. I.R.C. § 61(a).
129. The "inconsistent event" test proposed in Tennessee-Carolina is a broader rejection of
annual accounting principles than the proposed approach, which requires a "recovery" but
uses the rationale in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), to find a recovery
based on past deferral of realization. The situations in which the distinction is relevant may be
rare. Consider as a possibility the situation in Hillsboro Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1981) and First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. United States, 614 F.2d
I 142 (7th Cir. 1980). In these cases, a bank paid a tax levied by the state on the shareholders
based on the value of their shares. The payment of this tax by the bank was deductible under
I.R.C. § 164(e). When the state tax was found unconstitutional, the tax was refunded to the
shareholders. J.Jnder the "inconsistent event" test, adopted by the Seventh Circuit, the result is
easy: the deduction presumed a tax; there was ultimately no tax; the bank must make good for
the past deduction, despite annual accounting principles.
Under the more restrictive test proposed here, the result is more problematic. At the time
of the deduction, the bank had incurred an expense and deducted it, just as in the case of
expensed assets. But unlike the situation in Kirby Lumber, in which there was the untaxed
receipt of loan proceeds, or the case of expensed assets, in which there is the untaxed accumulation of assets, the bank took in no unrealized gain. At the time the tax was refunded, it was
paid to the shareholder. Although it may be reasonable to attribute the shareholders' benefit
to the corporation, see note 43 supra and accompanying text, this approach would raise questions about whether the bank should be taxed on involuntary payments to shareholders,
whether intent to pay the tax should be interpreted as intent to pay a dividend, and why
Congress chose to allow deductions by the corporation of "dividends" used to pay taxes but
not direct payments to shareholders. Because of reliance on the "inconsistent event" test, these
issues were not examined in Hillsboro or Taylorville.
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general policies of nonrecognition nor the Code's specific applications to liquidating corporations favor nonrecognition of this element of gain, except possibly in the case of a liquidation of a
subsidiary to whi~h the section 334(b)(1) carryover basis applies. 130
Finally, section 336 is not a bar to recognizing gains which are the
result of accounting methods rather than actual asset appreciation.
The mechanical application of section 336 would ignore the purposes behind that provision as well as section 111, and would run
counter to the policy embodied in other parts of the Code against
permitting similar gains to escape taxation. The rule advocated here
comports with the basic concept of a tax on net income, prevents
unwarranted transfer of tax liability out of the corporate system, and
is consistent with the policy of nonrecognition as a means of avoiding both artificial tax barriers and tax incentives to changes in enterprise form.

130. In that situation, there is no transfer of income out of the corporate system, see notes
39 & 61 supra, and the parent and subsidiary may reasonably be viewed as a single taxpaying
entity, see notes 72 & 74 supra. In addition, the analogy to § 1245 in this situation favors
nomecognition. See I.R.C. §§ 1245{b)(3), 336(b)(2) (exceptions to depreciation and LIFO recapture where transferee takes transferor's basis). Deferral in this instance would be consistent
with the purpose behind § 332 to avoid deterring simplification of corporate structure. See B.
BIITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 20, at ~ I 1.40.

